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The Constitutional Convention Call
George W. Hardy, Jr.*
The question of constitutional revision has been exposed to
the attention of the general public by the passage of Act 166
of 1956 providing for the call for a constitutional convention
and the submission of the question of the holding of such conven-
tion, under said call, to a vote of the qualified electors of the
state.
The bill, as originally introduced in the House, was a ver-
batim reproduction of a convention call drafted by a committee
of the Louisiana State Bar Association,' with the exception of
the provisions fixing the number and the method of selection
of the delegates to the convention. 2 Subsequent to the introduc-
tion of the bill it was further altered by the adoption of a num-
ber of amendments. As amended, the bill was finally enacted.
The amendments embrace the following directives:
(a). The mandatory retention of the present Bill of Rights
as specifically set forth in sections 1 to 15 of article I
of the Constitution of 1921 as amended, and a prohibi-
tion against the adoption or insertion by the conven-
tion of any provision or ordinance detracting from or
conflicting with the specified sections of the present
Constitution.3
(b). A prohibition against any enactment affecting the
terms of office of any elected official of the state, or
any subdivision thereof, prior to the expiration of the
term for which such official might be holding at the
time of the adoption of a new Constitution.
4
(c). A requirement for submission of the Constitution to
the vote of the people of the state for ratification.5
(d). A mandatory injunction upon the convention to incor-
porate in the new Constitution, verbatim, the provi-
* Judge, Second Circuit, Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana.
1. 1 LA. B.J. 24 (1953).
2. La. Acts 1956, No. 166, § 2.
3. Id. § 1(1).
4. Id. § 1(2).
5. Id. §§ 1(2), 7.
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sions of sections 1, 5, 6, and 18 of article VIII (Suffrage
and Elections) of the Constitution as amended, and a
prohibition against the incorporation of any provisions
derogating from or conflicting with any of said sec-
tions.(
(e). An appropriation to defray the expenses of the con-
vention.7
The amendments dealing with the Bill of Rights and with
matters under the title of Suffrage and Elections were adopted
at the insistence of the so-called "segregation bloc." Parentheti-
cally, it is appropriate to observe that while these mandates serve
to prevent the weakening of existing constitutional provisions,
the converse proposition appears to be equally true in that the
same mandates effectively prevent the strengthening of the exist-
ing provisions.
The provision for submission of the Constitution to a vote of
the electorate unquestionably resulted from a preponderant sen-
timent that the people should be given this final means of pro-
tection against any innovations which might be deemed to affect
their interests adversely.
It would appear that the aura of controversy which has sur-
rounded Act 166 is more political than legal in nature. As a
matter of fact, the author of this article is cognizant of only one
legal question that has been suggested.
In hearings on the bill before the judiciary committee of the
House and Senate it was strongly indicated that legal proceed-
ings contesting the validity of the act would be instituted. The
assertion was made that such an action would be predicated
upon the contention that the bill was passed in the House by less
than the two-thirds vote required by the Constitution with re-
spect to constitutional amendments.
It must be conceded that if an act providing for the holding
of a constitutional convention should be construed as an amend-
ment to the existing Constitution, then such an act requires pas-
sage by not less than a two-thirds vote of House and Senate.
6. Id. § 1(2). The specified sections relate to qualifications for voting, dis-
qualifications from the exercise of the right of suffrage or of holding office, the
method of appointment of Registrars of Voters, and the composition of the Board
of Registration.
7. Id. § 4(3).
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However, that does not appear to be the law, and it would seem
that almost the identical question has been decisively answered
by our Supreme Court in State v. Favre. The court reached the
positive and unqualified conclusion that a Constitution adopted
by a convention is not an amendment to an existing Constitution.
The point was adequately resolved in the opinion as follows:
"The first proposition rests upon the hypothesis that the
instrument framed by the constitutional convention of 1898
is a mere amendment to the constitution of 1879, and, not
having been submitted to the people for their ratification or
rejection thereof, same is null and void. If it be an amend-
ment, counsel's proposition is undoubtedly correct; but we
think it is manifestly incorrect. The principal contention of
counsel in favor of his theory is that the legislative act,
which proposed the convention scheme, suggested certain re-
strictions to be placed upon the delegates to be thereto ac-
credited, when in convention assembled, and that, in con-
sequence thereof, certain provisions of the constitution of
1879 were left in full force; hence the present constitution
is essentially an amendment thereof. Taking a comprehen-
sive view of the question, the exact converse of that proposi-
tion would seem to be the correct one; for, in general ac-
ceptation, a proposed constitutional amendment is a legis-
lative suggestion that certain specified things be done
through the instrumentality of a vote of the people, whereby
a change is effected in the organic law, and not that the con-
stitution remain unaltered in certain specified particulars.
That the terms of the statute proposing a constitutional con-
vention were not unlimited and sweeping would seem to make
no practical difference, as the convention was called upon
the lines which were suggested by the legislature, and in
exact conformity with the will of the sovereign, as expressed
at an election duly held in keeping therewith, and the dele-
gates duly chosen thereto were regularly convened and or-
ganized, and thereafter framed and promulgated an instru-
ment which is styled a 'Constitution for the State of Lou-
isiana.' We deem it to be our duty to accept that instrument
as the organic law of the state, without any hesitation or
resort to any refined distinctions or subtle argument on the
question; and, thus accepting same, it is, in our opinion, ex-
8. 51 La. Ann. 434, 435, 25 So. 93, 94 (1898).
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actly what it purports to be, - a constitution, - and not an
amendment to an existing constitution."
In State v. American Sugar Refining Company9 the court
thoroughly considered the question as to the method and manner
of calling constitutional conventions. This point was developed
not only through interpretation of prior state constitutions but
also in the light of the prevailing custom in the United States.10
In resolving this question the court said:
"When the people, acting under a proper resolution of the
Legislature, vote in favor of calling a convention, they are
presumed to ratify the terms of the call, which thereby be-
comes the basis of the authority delegated to the convention."
These holdings of our Supreme Court are unquestionably in
line with the well developed majority concept. The distinction
between amendment and revision is clearly made by authorita-
tive commentators. Judge Cooley" marks this distinction be-
tween revision and amendment in the following comment:
"But the will of the people to this end - [constitutional re-
vision or amendment] - can only be expressed in the legit-
imate modes by which such a body politic can act, and which
must either be prescribed by the constitution whose revision
or amendment is sought, or by an act of the legislative de-
partment of the State, which alone would be authorized to
speak for the people upon this subject, and to point out a
mode for the expression of their will in the absence of any
provision for amendment or revision contained in the Con-
stitution itself."
Judge Jameson, in his work on Constitutional Conventions,
traces the evolution of the method of constitutional revision from
a direct assembly of the people in convention to the issuance of
a convention call by the legislature, as the appropriate depart-
ment of government for the purpose of initiating and authorizing
the holding of a convention. The author rejects the fallacy that
the legislature is denied power to call conventions for a general
constitutional revision because of the existence of express provi-
sions governing the method of amendment.
12
9. 137 La. 407, 411, 68 So. 742, 745 (1915).
10. Citing 6 R.C.L. §§ 17, 18 (1914-21) ; 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONS 56 (7th ed. 1903).
11. 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 84-85 (8th ed. 1927).
12. JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS § 219 et seq.
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The conclusion that the procedure for constitutional revision
is not subject to regulation applicable to constitutional amend-
ment seems to be established beyond question. In the instant
case the call for a convention, enacted by the Legislature and
submitted to the people, as the sovereign power, for ratification
or rejection, undoubtedly conforms to recognized procedure. The
additional precaution requiring submission of the Constitution,
drafted by the convention, to the people as the sovereign, is an-
other consideration which prejudices the validity of the some-
what technical basis of the original objection.
Understandably, the greater part of the act itself consists
of more or less pro forma provisions dealing with the appoint-
ment and election of delegates, the conduct of the election, quali-
fications and compensation of delegates, and the time and pro-
cedure with respect to the meeting and opening of the conven-
tion. These provisions were derived from similar acts calling
prior conventions and from study of the most approved and best
established principles and precedents.
Attention should be called to the provisions of section 5 of the
act which represent two novel departures from previous conven-
tion calls. The first deals with specific authorization for the
election or appointment of public officials of the state and its
subdivisions, and relieves such officials from the application of
laws prohibiting dual office-holding. The second provision of
this section specifically establishes the right of any attorney at
law, serving as a delegate to the convention, to the continuance
of any case in which he is bona fide counsel of record. This
authorization was deemed necessary in view of holdings of the
Supreme Court"3 refusing to recognize a resolution of the con-
vention of 1921 authorizing the continuance of cases, on the
ground that a convention cannot assume legislative powers. This
provision was designed to establish a legislative basis for the
relief specified.
Perhaps the principal contribution of the act is found in the
detailed provisions governing the organization of the convention
itself. 14 The background for the meticulously devised organiza-
tional scheme lies in a recognition of the waste of effort, the
overlapping jurisdiction and the inevitable cross-purposes of the
13. State ex rel. Hoffman v. Judge, 149 La. 363, 89 So. 215 (1921) ; Pender
v. Gray, 149 La. 184, 88 So. 786 (1921).
14. La. Acts 1956, No. 166, § 6.
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multiplicity of committees created by preceding conventions, par-
ticularly the convention of 1921. The organization of the con-
vention of 1921, somewhat haphazardly undertaken, called for
the appointment of thirty-five standing committees. This di-
vision of effort, instead of contributing to efficient consideration
and operation, produced exactly the opposite result and seriously
hampered the deliberations of the convention.
The scientifically devised organizational plan of the conven-
tion, while permitting the establishment of additional committees
and sub-committees, distributes the work of the convention, ac-
cording to subject matter, among seven working committees.
The plan of organization is best demonstrated by the chart set
forth on page 129 which graphically illustrates the effective cor-
relation of the authority of the officers of the convention and
the subject matters of constitutional concern which are vested
in the working committees. It is apparent from an examination
of this chart and a comparison of the topics assigned to the
several committees that every major field of constitutional ac-
tion is adequately recognized.
It should be observed that several features of the convention
call, as incorporated in Act 166, have been the subject of violent
controversy. Particularly is this true with respect to the pro-
vision for the appointment of delegates by the Governor.1 5 It is
felt that the pros and cons of this question lie entirely beyond
the scope of this discussion, and, accordingly, it has been the
purpose of the development of this article to deal objectively
with what may be regarded as the primary concerns of the act
itself. Undoubtedly, any act providing for so important an un-
dertaking as the complete revision of the constitution of our
state is subject to objection and opposition, much of which,
as has been heretofore observed, is political in origin and de-
velopment. However this may be, and regardless of what action
has been taken by the people of the state, it is only fair
to conclude that the enactment of the convention call of 1956
represents, in many particulars, an imaginative and constructive
development.
15. Id. § 2.
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